

## Civil-Military Relations in India – Introspection and Reform

Commander Ranendra Singh Sawan®

*“Politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without any direction.”*

*K Subrahmanyam<sup>1</sup>*

### Abstract

*This year’s winning essay examines civil-military relations (CMR) in a historical perspective, leading up to its present status. The essay also identifies crucial areas of civil-military dissonance – both from a military as well as civilian perspective, while critically examining the measures proposed for reformation of higher defence management and strengthening CMR. It prescribes reforms in CMR could be most effectively implemented by a ‘Top-Down Approach’. However, the author proposes a more pragmatic ‘Lateral or Indirect Approach’. It also suggests means of strengthening CMR further in the interest of the nation.*

### Introduction

A study of history of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in independent

India reveals two distinct issues – the first is a conscious and deliberate decision by our national leaders to isolate the armed forces from political influence and interference, and the second is a systematic and gradual degradation of the status of the Indian Armed Forces vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. While the former aspect could be viewed positively because of its effect of keeping the armed forces apolitical, it also connotes an apprehension on the part of politicians about the military playing a larger role in policy making. The other aspect, of marginalisation and tight civilian control, emanates from political apathy and perhaps lies at the core of CMR debate in India.

The current discourse on CMR, therefore, represents a conflict between the civilian and military perspectives. The civilian perspective is that the existing system has worked well in the past

and, therefore, there is no need to alter the *status quo*<sup>2</sup>. The military, however, feels marginalised as far as the strategic decision making is concerned. Arun Prakash alludes to this 'huge perceptual gap' as a key feature of the current CMR. While the political and bureaucratic establishments see nothing amiss and have remained staunch upholders of the *status quo*; the military and the veterans seethe with dissatisfaction at an increasingly asymmetric and deliberately contrived civil-military equation.<sup>3</sup>

This essay will examine the state of CMR that exist today, in light of its historical context, and suggest means of strengthening them further in the interest of the nation. While doing so, the essay will also attempt to identify critical areas of civil-military dissonance – both from the military as well as the civilian perspective. The essay also critically examines the measures that have been proposed for reformation of higher defence management and strengthening CMR. It advocates that while reform in CMR could be most effectively implemented by a 'Top-Down Approach', it is unlikely to be undertaken. Therefore, this essay proposes a 'Lateral or Indirect Approach' that appears to be more pragmatic.

### **Historical Context of CMR in Independent India**

Historically, with only a few exceptions, India's political leaders have sought to insulate the military from politics. Bhimaya posits that India's political leaders always desired that the apolitical nature of the armed forces be preserved under due civilian control and her military leaders have accepted and propagated this principle.<sup>4</sup> Anit Mukherjee echoes these views.<sup>5</sup>

In their research, both Kundu<sup>6</sup> and Bhimaya<sup>7</sup>, while studying the militaries of India and Pakistan, have concluded that Indian politicians made no attempts to either politicise the Army or interfere in their professional work. According to PS Das, one of the members of the Arun Singh committee, "among all major democracies in the world the Indian military chiefs [army, navy and air force] are one of the most powerful, having both operational and staffing responsibilities".<sup>8</sup>

Former IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy has observed that since independence, it had been the practice for the government to discuss directly with the concerned Service Chiefs or at times with a Commander-in-Chief about a situation that they can

absorb quickly and give direction.<sup>9</sup> In 1965, the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri gave a free hand to the Service Chiefs in military operations.<sup>10</sup> Indira Gandhi's decision to postpone military operations by nine months in 1971 and the more recent acceptance of the Army's position on Siachen by the Government also illustrate this assertion.<sup>11</sup>

However, there have been exceptions to the general practice of accepting professional advice from military officers. For example, in 1951 the Chief of the Army Staff, General Cariappa, having delivered a lengthy warning to Nehru about Chinese military pretensions, was bluntly told that it was not his job "to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where".<sup>12</sup> At the outbreak of the 1965 War, the then Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral BS Soman met Prime Minister Shastri and protested against an MoD order forbidding the Navy to initiate any offensive action against Pakistan at sea and restraining the Navy's operations to south of Porbandar. He argued that it would adversely affect the morale of the Service. However, the Prime Minister refused to rescind the order and upon further urging by the CNS, he said "You have no choice".<sup>13</sup>

Arun Prakash, tracing the historical evolution of CMR in India from Lord Kitchener to Kargil Review, has identified the establishing of 'bureaucratic control' over the military as a root cause of present-day civil-military discord.<sup>14</sup> Even in recent years, the CMR debate has largely been focused on the *inter-se* equation between the armed forces and the MoD. The underlying argument is that since the politician does not always involve himself in policymaking, 'civil authority' is represented by a duality or even trinity consisting of a combination of the politician, bureaucrat and scientist.<sup>15</sup> As a consequence, the present relationship between the civilian establishment and the military is characterised by the distortion of the concept of 'civilian supremacy' to 'bureaucratic control'. This view is supported by Dhruv Katoch, who avers that as per established tenets and global practices, the civilian principal (in CMR) remains the political leadership and legislative oversight and not the bureaucracy.<sup>16</sup>

Many authors have also written about the mutual mistrust and suspicion between the military and the bureaucracy. The events leading to the resignation by General KS Thimayya in Aug 1959, and subsequent rescindment of the same by Pandit Nehru; appointment

of Lt Gen BM Kaul as the Corps Commander against the advice of General Thimayya; sacking of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in 1998; and the controversy about the Army Chief's date of birth in 2011, are a few instances which demonstrate the widening chasm between the military and politico-bureaucratic establishment. More recently, the controversial report of troop movements in January 2012 "spooking Raisina Hill"<sup>17</sup> highlights the perceived mistrust between the political establishment and the military. Commenting on the issue, Manoj Joshi wrote, "The game is a simple one. The scaring is done by the intelligence-bureaucracy combine, and those to be scared are the politicians. This has worked well in the past".<sup>18</sup>

### **CMR after the Kargil Conflict**

The Kargil war was a watershed event in India's military history. A severe indictment of India's higher defence management is found in the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) which stated that, "There has been little change over the past 52 years despite the 1962 debacle, the 1965 stalemate and the 1971 victory".<sup>19</sup> The KRC Report also observed that India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure.<sup>20</sup>

Post Kargil, the government did implement some half-hearted measures towards reformation of higher defence management. However, most of these reforms were cosmetic in nature, as evinced from the existing 'integrated' headquarters of MoD and the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. Almost every commentator on the subject has suggested that the recommendations of the KRC and subsequent committees on defence reforms be implemented.<sup>21</sup> Successive parliamentary committees have also reiterated this issue.<sup>22</sup> Admittedly, in some measure, the slow pace of defence reforms is attributable to inter-Service turf rivalry. However, the larger share of blame rests squarely with the politico-bureaucratic establishment, for reasons already identified earlier in this essay.

According to some experts, there has been an erosion of administrative effectiveness of the Service Chiefs<sup>23</sup> due to their relationship with the Defence Secretary and other secretaries of the departments of the MoD, who take decisions with a critical impact on the combat readiness of the armed forces without much domain knowledge on military matters. The accountability for failures and shortcomings in military operations is also a contentious issue. As

Admiral DK Joshi told a TV channel, “Where there is authority, there is no accountability; and where there is responsibility, there is no authority”.<sup>24</sup> The Admiral had resigned on 26 February 2014 assuming moral responsibility for repeated accidents in the Navy. The root cause, he stated, was the dysfunctional and inefficient operating environment wherein the Navy did not have the power to replace submarine batteries or to offload refits and repairs of its ships and submarines.<sup>25</sup>

The larger, and equally important, issue is the non-involvement of the military in the higher decision making processes pertaining to national security. There is no defined role for the Service Chiefs in the Constitution, any Act of the Parliament or in any government rule<sup>26</sup> and there is a lack of institutionalised higher channels of communication with the government.<sup>27</sup> Arun Prakash quotes George Tanham who, while commenting on the “tight civilian control of the military, stated, “India has pursued this policy to a point where the military have almost no input in the formulation of higher defence policy and national strategy”.<sup>28</sup> Deepak Kapoor has mentioned that the Service Chiefs are rarely involved in higher decision making process.<sup>29</sup> Raj Shukla recommends eliminating cronyism – a near total domination of the security processes and apex positions in the national security structures by the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Foreign Service.<sup>30</sup>

### **The Civilian Narrative**

While the civilian establishment, in general, agrees to the need for reform, their views are not as strong.<sup>31</sup> Former Defence Secretary, Shekhar Dutt, writes that ‘*assertion*’, which is an intrinsic military characteristic, is alien to the democratic construct<sup>32</sup> and is thus the reason for dissatisfaction of the armed forces with the existing structures. Dutt also provides a different view of the term ‘civilian supremacy’ and states that it is about the ability to function within the existing resource constraint and deliver through an internal prioritisation, rebalancing and re-strategisation – an arbiter of sorts among the Services.<sup>33</sup>

On the issue of professional knowledge and expertise, Dutt argues that it is the knowledge of administrative processes and experience that matters<sup>34</sup>, adding that the military cannot compensate for the value of civilian bureaucracy as an interface with the political

leadership.<sup>35</sup> On the issue of Government Business Rules, he curtly writes that instead of quoting from the *rules of business* there is a need to identify what national defence has to deliver.<sup>36</sup>

NN Vohra strongly rejects the notion that politicians are averse to dealing with military matters. Quoting his association with eight *Raksha Mantris*, he avers that they remained most seriously concerned about national security management issues while being overburdened with a horde of crisis situations on varied fronts.<sup>37</sup> However, NS Brar counters this view and writes that “the Hon’ble Defence Minister recently expressed the view that the country had lost respect for the armed forces, or the armed forces relevance had declined as there had not been any war since 1971” and that “a worthy politician had recently derided the death of a soldier by opining that *they are paid to die*”.<sup>38</sup>

### **Measures to Strengthen CMR**

Much has been written about the measures required to improve CMR in India. Clearly, as far as the military and civilian perspectives are concerned, the deliverables of ‘strong CMR’ would be:-

**Table 1 : Comparison of ‘Deliverables’ for a Healthy CMR from the Military and Civilian Perspectives**

<b>Deliverables of CMR Military Perspective</b>	<b>Deliverables of CMR Civilian Perspective</b>
Greater participation of the military in national security decision-making process.	Civilian oversight of national security decision-making process.
Restoration of superior status of armed forces vis-à-vis the MoD bureaucracy, which actually supports the former.	Maintain status quo.
Acceptance of ‘Political’ but not ‘Bureaucratic’ control	
Greater autonomy for the armed forces in terms of defence policy decisions, procurements and service matters.	Civilian oversight in defence policy and finance.

It is evident from Table 1 above that the military and civilian ‘deliverables’ of a healthy CMR are intricately inter-linked in a zero-sum scenario. While the armed forces seek to break free from

bureaucratic control, the bureaucracy would not like to concede the *status quo*. Unsurprisingly, therefore, all narratives on bridging the civil-military gap and strengthening CMR broadly focus on a 'Top Down' approach to resolve this stalemate. These suggest administrative and organisational changes, enabling legislations and rules, and indirect measures.

**Administrative and Organisational Changes.** Without delving into details of the recommendations brought forth by various committees and task forces on defence reforms, undoubtedly the first and most obvious step is to implement these recommendations in letter and spirit. Many experts believe that the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would go a long way in improving CMR.<sup>39</sup>

Some experts have proposed revitalisation of the forums and channels of communication between the senior echelons of the military and the Government<sup>40</sup>, which is an important and workable step, if implemented in true spirit. Creation of a specialist cadre among the IAS for the MoD has also been suggested by some experts. While this is desirable, it is unlikely to gain traction among the bureaucracy, given their existing HR policies. Alternatively, it has also been suggested to increase the allocation of vacancies in courses of military instructions for such cadre officers, linked to career prospects. However, this step would only be effective if the officers so trained would continue to serve in the MoD. Cross-posting of Service officers in the MoD, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the National Security Council (NSC) was suggested in the KRC reforms and has been backed by some experts.

**Enabling Legislations and Government Rules.** It has been rightly suggested that India's CMR problems can *only be addressed* through sweeping constitutional and legislative measures that would bring the armed forces directly within the apex decision making structure. In this context, an Armed Forces Act which specifies the roles, responsibilities and relationship between the MoD and its constituent departments with the Service HQs has been proposed.<sup>41</sup> However, the fact that even the administrative reforms suggested by various empowered committees are yet to be implemented is indicative of the lack of appetite for legislative reforms.

**Indirect or Lateral Approach.** These are measures that the armed forces would need to initiate, since the politico-bureaucratic

establishment has historically not demonstrated much inclination to alter the *status quo*. The underlying principle in this approach is 'Objective Control of the Military'. These measures would not, by themselves, facilitate an improvement in CMR directly. They would, however, create an environment that would perhaps enable bridging the gap between the civilian apparatus and the military.

**Fostering Public Debate on CMR.** The armed forces must endeavour to encourage public debate on CMR in India. This would require collaboration with think-tanks and engaging the media. Unless there is public awareness and concern about the existing state of CMR in the country, it will not be possible to attract the attention of the political leadership to this important issue. The armed forces could also sponsor academic research in this field, focusing primarily on the impact of CMR on military effectiveness as evidenced from past operations, which could then lead to further discussions. Media must be leveraged; firstly, to reinforce the image of the armed forces; secondly, it can also create awareness and provide focus on the various issues plaguing healthy CMR. Autonomous institutes must also be encouraged to steer this debate. Two recent examples where public outrage and empathy forced the government to reconsider their decisions are withdrawal of the MoD note on the equivalence between the armed forces and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Services (AFHQ CS)<sup>42</sup> and the more recent controversy over withdrawal of tax exemption on disability pension of veterans.<sup>43</sup>

**Nurturing 'Soldier-Statesmen'.** Referring to the valid critique that military officers, simply, do not think, read and write enough, Raj Shukla proposes a radical overhaul of military's structures and processes to encourage the intellectual tradition that produces soldiers of stature that matches statesmen.<sup>44</sup> Dhruv Katoch agrees with this view and laments that despite having fought a number of wars since independence and a continual engagement in sub-conventional conflict, our military leadership remains tactical in thought orientation.<sup>45</sup> When senior military officers would begin to think and act like statesmen, they would be able to promote healthier CMR.

**Apex Military Leadership.** The military also shares significant responsibility in the current status of CMR. A historical analysis reveals that over the years, the military has conceded much ground

to the civilian establishment in terms of higher decision making. Examples of this are; asking for approvals where none were required; seeking bureaucratic arbitration in inter and intra-service disagreements; accommodating civilian incursion in purely military matters; seeking to establish equivalence with civilians where it neither exists nor is required; and acquiescing to civilian diktats to achieve short term gains.

### **Conclusion**

It is apparent that India's current CMR framework is heavily skewed in favour of the civilian bureaucracy. Various analysts have quoted recent examples of manifestations of this discord such as; the MoD spokesperson's broad accusations against military officers on the misuse of *jawans* and government vehicles; of engaging in "endless parties"<sup>46</sup>; anomalies in the Seventh Pay Commission; implementation of OROP<sup>47</sup>; frequent tussles about rank-equations with civilian cadres; controversies related to opening of cantonments to the public; and politicisation of 'surgical strikes'<sup>48</sup>.

A study of the 1962 conflict, as also of the 1965 and 1971 wars, clearly brings out the imperative necessity and urgency of educating the people about the basics of war and familiarising them with military matters, if a democratic state is to be safe and strong.<sup>49</sup> There is clearly a need for 'educating the people' and then for the CMR discourse to be openly discussed and critiqued.

While this essay acknowledges the need for radical (constitutional and legislative) changes to address the CMR problem in India, it argues that it may not be prudent to rely solely on the politico-bureaucratic establishment to drive this change since they do not share the perceptions of the armed forces. It is paradoxical that although the focus of CMR reforms lies on the civilian side, they are unwilling to embrace reforms. At the same time, given the constitutional framework under which India's armed forces function, this change can only come from the civilian side. Therefore, this essay makes a case for regaining lost ground through internal mechanisms, much in the way it has been lost over the past decades. The need is, therefore, for the military to introspect and create an environment for change and drive the change that the armed forces desire.

### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup> A. Mukherjee, *'The Absent Dialogue'*, IDSA Seminar Issue, Seminar, Issue No. 599, July 2009, available at [www.idsa.in/event/CivilMilitaryRelationsandMilitaryEffectivenessinIndia](http://www.idsa.in/event/CivilMilitaryRelationsandMilitaryEffectivenessinIndia) accessed on 06 August 2019.

<sup>2</sup> V. Misra (ed.), *Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms*, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, p. 28

<sup>3</sup> A. Prakash, *Better Civil-Military Relations Needed for Improved Security of the Indian State*, South Asia Monitor, 22 July 2018 available at <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/better-civil-military-relations-needed-for-improved-security-of-indian-state/> accessed on 04 August 2019.

<sup>4</sup> K.M. Bhimaya, *Civil Military Relations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan*, RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica 1997, p. 80

<sup>5</sup> Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 44

<sup>6</sup> A. Kundu, *Civil Military Relations in British and Independent India, 1918-1962 and Coup Prediction Theory*, University of London School of Economics and Political Science, Proquest LLC, 1995, pp. 205-213 available at <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1411/1/U084466.pdf> accessed on 14 July 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Bhimaya, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-72

<sup>8</sup> Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 47

<sup>9</sup> V. Misra (ed.), *Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms*, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, pp. 41-42

<sup>10</sup> Bhimaya, *op. cit.*, p. 83

<sup>11</sup> Rahul K Bhonsle, *Civil-Military Relations: The Indian Case*, PILDAT Background Paper, Islamabad 2011, p. 15

<sup>12</sup> Quoted in C B Khanduri, *Field Marshal K M Cariappa: His Life and Times* (New Delhi, 1995), p. 260

<sup>13</sup> G.M. Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph*, Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi: 1999, pp. 43-44

<sup>14</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-27 (The Kitchener-Curzon dispute over the appointment of the military member of the Viceroy's Council was an early example of Civil Military discord)

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> D. Katoch, *Fissures in Civil-Military Relations: What Needs to be Done*, 02 November 2015, available at <https://salute.co.in/fissures-in-civil-military-relations-what-needs-to-be-done/> accessed on 04 August 2019.

<sup>17</sup> *The January Night Raisina Hill was Spooked*, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 04 April 2012.

<sup>18</sup> *He saw coup coming: Army chief terms 'spooking of Raisina Hill' report in a leading newspaper 'absolutely stupid'*, Mail Online, 05 April 2012, available at [www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2125813](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2125813) accessed on 06 August 2019.

<sup>19</sup> *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi 2000, p. 252

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, p. 258

<sup>21</sup> See V. Misra (ed.), *Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms*, ed Vinod Misra, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, *et passim*.

<sup>22</sup> Standing Committee on Defence, Twenty Second Report 2006-2007), Lok Sabha Secretariat, July 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 32

<sup>24</sup> The Times of India (online ed), *Quit due to dysfunctional environment in Navy, admiral Joshi says*, 15 October 2014, available at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Quit-due-to-dysfunctional-environment-in-Navy-Admiral-Joshi-says/articleshow/44808803.cms> accessed on 04 August 2019.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 35

<sup>27</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 22

<sup>28</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 23

<sup>29</sup> V. Misra (ed.), *Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms*, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, pp. 51-54)

<sup>30</sup> Raj Shukla, *Civil Military Relations in India*, Manekshaw Paper No 36, Centre of Land Warfare Studies and KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2012, p.29.

<sup>31</sup> See the 22<sup>nd</sup> Report of the Standing Committee on Defence 2006-2007. Also see the issues raised by Shri NN Vohra, Governor J&K, in USI National Security Lecture 2013 ([http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/CivilMilitaryRelations\\_NNVohra](http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/CivilMilitaryRelations_NNVohra)). Also see, Shekhar Dutt, *The Conundrum of Indian Defence and Civil-Military Relationship*, Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms, ed. Vinod Misra, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, pp. 10-19

<sup>32</sup> Shekhar Dutt, *The Conundrum of Indian Defence and Civil-Military Relationship*, Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms, ed Vinod Misra, IDSA/ Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, p. 10.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> N.S. Brar, *Politics and the Military*, IDSA comment, 24 August 2015, accessed at [https://idsa.in/idsacomments/Politicsand theMilitary\\_nsbrar\\_240815](https://idsa.in/idsacomments/Politicsand theMilitary_nsbrar_240815) on 07 August 2019.

<sup>39</sup> A. Prakash and D. Kapoor in *Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms*, ed Vinod Misra, IDSA/Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2015, et passim.

<sup>40</sup> Kapoor, *op. cit.* pp. 70-71.

<sup>41</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>42</sup> The Times of India, *Defence Ministry withdraws note on status equivalence*, 05 January 2018, accessed at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/defence-ministry-withdraws-controversial-note-on-status-equivalence/articleshow/62384338.cms> on 06 August 2019.

<sup>43</sup> The Economic Times, *Will look into tax on disability pension: Rajnath Singh*, 28 June 2019, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/will-look-into-issue-of-tax-on-disability-pension-rajnath-singh/articleshow/69984433.cms?from=mdr> accessed on 06 August 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Shukla, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>45</sup> Katoch, *op. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> D.S. Hooda, *Need to Review civil-Military Relations*, Opinion published online at <https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/need-to-review-civil-military-relations-writes-lt-gen-ds-hooda-after-row-over-defence-spokespersons-tweet-1924035.html> accessed on 05 August 2019.

<sup>47</sup> Cowshish, *op. cit.*

<sup>48</sup> Prakash, *op. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> S.N. Prasad, P.B. Sinha and A.A. Athale, *History of the Conflict with China 1962* (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence 1992), p xxiv.

**@Commander Ranendra Singh Sawan** was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 01 July 1996. He is presently posted as Directing Staff at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Nilgiris. He is also pursuing PhD from the University of Mumbai. This is the edited version of the first prize winning entry of the USI Gen SL Menezes Memorial Essay Competition 2019.

*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CL, No. 619, January-March 2020.